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ABSTRACT 
The Human Genome Project generated oceans of DNA 
sequence data and spurred a multinational race to grab the 
bounties of these oceans. In response to these DNA property grabs, 
UNESCO, drawing upon international law precedents addressing 
analogous grabs in the past, declared the Human Genome the 
heritage of humanity. The UNESCO Declaration provided, first, 
that the heritage shall not, in its natural state, give rise to financial 
gains and, second, that countries establish an international 
framework to make the benefits from genome research available to 
all. This iBrief will first examine Grotius’s Mare Liberum to 
determine whether international law precedent indeed bars the 
private appropriation of a common heritage.  Second, the iBrief 
will revisit the framework developed by Pardo for the exploitation 
of the mineral resources of the ocean floor and analyze whether it 
could serve as a model for an international framework for sharing 
the benefits of current genome research.  
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The completion of the Human Genome Project (HGP) has 
generated oceans of DNA data.  These oceans, however, have proven prone 
to exploitation through fishery and piracy.  In the early stages of the HGP, 
the U.S. National Institute of Health (NIH) claimed ownership of the DNA 
sequence data, triggering a multinational race to the patent office.2  While 
the NIH eventually abandoned its patent applications, private firms have 
since staked their own claims to DNA fragments covering most of the genes 
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in the human body.3  The claims have been met with severe criticism. 
Specifically, the scientific community has made a compelling case that 
many of the claimed fragments lack utility.4  However, in focusing on the 
statutory patent law requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, utility and 
enabling disclosure, a more fundamental issue has been largely ignored: Are 
the DNA sequences of the human genome patentable subject matter per se?  
One fundamental objection to the patentability of the Human Genome does 
not stem from patent law but rather is suggested by international solutions 
to previous races to grab the bounties of the human heritage. 
¶2 In the 17th century Spain and Portugal claimed the right to exclude 
all foreigners from navigating or entering the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.5  
In 1602 the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was formed, and as it 
attempted to trade with the East Indies, its vessels came into competition 
with those of the Portuguese.6  When the VOC seized a large Portuguese 
galleon in the Strait of Malacca, located between present-day Sumatra and 
Malaysia, it had to convince its potential allies of the legality of its seizure.7  
To that end the VOC commissioned Hugo Grotius to write a defense of the 
Free Seas. Grotius’s tractate,  Mare Liberum, was to rule the waves for over 
three centuries, until its laissez faire laissez passer implications triggered a 
second race to grab the bounties of the human heritage. 
¶3 The second race began in 1873 when “the Challenger expedition 
discovered the presence of potato-sized manganese nodules scattered across 
large areas of the sea-bed.”8  It was not long before technological 
improvements increased the opportunities for prospecting, exploring and 
exploiting these resources.  These developments prompted the US to claim 
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ownership of the natural resources of the continental shelf beneath the high 
seas.9  This proclamation triggered a proliferation of similar claims by other 
nations.10  Following these claims by nations, a private company, US Deep 
Sea Ventures Inc., claimed exclusive mining rights to a specified nodule 
deposit in the Pacific.11  This race to privatize the bounties of the Deep 
Seabed urged Arvid Pardo, in his seminal address delivered to the United 
Nations General Assembly, to propose that the resources of the deep seabed 
be declared the common heritage of mankind.12  Under Pardo’s proposal, 
the exploitation of this heritage was to be controlled by an international 
authority, as a trustee for all countries and for the benefit of mankind.13 
¶4 Drawing on Pardo’s proposal, the United Nations, faced with the 
multinational race to grab the bounties of the Human Genome, has endorsed 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human 
Rights (Declaration)14 stating, in a symbolic sense,15 that the human 
genome is the heritage of humanity.16  The Declaration stipulates that the 
human genome, in its natural state, shall not give rise to financial gains17 
and that an international framework be established to make the benefits of 
research on the genome available to all.18 The Declaration, however, raises 
two, interrelated, questions. 
¶5 First, the assumption underlying the prohibition on financial gain is 
that the common heritage principle bars private appropriation of the 
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concerned heritage. Part I of this iBrief will analyze whether this 
assumption is correct by revisiting Grotius’s Mare Liberum. As this iBrief 
will demonstrate, Grotius’s doctrine offers a surprisingly up-to-date 
framework by which to decide whether, to put it in Grotian terms, a 
common heritage is indeed a res omnium communis, incapable of 
appropriation, or a res nullius, exploitable on a “first come, first serve” 
basis. 
¶6 Second, the litmus test of the common heritage principle is how it 
can be reduced to practice. The Declaration stipulates that nation states 
create a framework of international cooperation between established and 
developing countries. However, while the Declaration lists a few measures 
that States should pursue in creating such a framework,19 it fails to provide 
a concrete structure for States to build upon.20  As one possible solution, 
organizations have proposed a global genome trust.21  For example, the U.S. 
National Research Council has suggested that the interests of donors of 
human DNA samples, collected from populations across the globe, could be 
represented by an international organization that would serve as a trustee 
and fund-holder for all the sampled populations.22  Additionally, a number 
of scientists recently urged the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) to examine new, open collaborative development models for DNA 
data, because excessive, unbalanced, or poorly designed intellectual 
property protections may be counter-productive.23   Part II of this iBrief will 
examine the viability of these proposals by revisiting the foremost example 
of an application of the common heritage principle: Pardo’s solution to the 
appropriation of the deep seabed resources. 
I. CAN A COMMON HERITAGE BE APPROPRIATED? MARE LIBERUM 
AND THE RIGHT TO FISH  
A. Mare Liberum: Context, Natural Law and Rationale 
¶7 On February 25, 1603, Jacob van Heemskerck, a Dutch Admiral 
employed by the Dutch East India Company (VOC), seized the Santa 
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Catharina, a rich laden Portuguese galleon, in the straits of Malacca.24  The 
matter was vital to the upstart VOC, as it attempted to trade with the East 
Indies at a time when Spain and Portugal, then united under one crown, had 
claimed the right to exclude all foreigners from navigating the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans.25  To convince potential allies of the legality of the capture, 
the VOC retained the twenty-one year-old Grotius to write a defense that 
would hold across the globe.26  Admitted to the Bars of Holland and 
Zeeland at the age of 17, Grotius framed his defense as a lawyer’s brief. He 
brought his case before the double tribunal of “Conscience, or the innate 
estimation of oneself, and Public Opinion, or the estimation of others.”27  
He appealed to the law that “is not difficult to find” but is “the same among 
all nations; and . . . is easy to understand, seeing that it is innate in every 
individual and implanted in his mind.”28  In brief, Grotius turned to natural 
law, as opposed to the man-made laws of a specific nation or jurisdiction. In 
Grotius’s opinion, the laws of nature were particularly persuasive because 
they had not been “graven on tablets of bronze or stone” but were “written 
in the minds and on the hearts of every individual, where even the unwilling 
and the refractory must read them.”29  To build his case of natural law, 
Grotius drew on a variety of authorities, including Spanish jurists, 
theologicians, and Roman law precedents.  
¶8 Grotius began his tractate by proclaiming what he called the 
“specific and unimpeachable axiom of the Law of Nations, called a primary 
rule or first principle . . . . Every nation is free to travel to every other 
nation, and to trade with it.”30  To illustrate the universal and timeless 
nature of this principle, Grotius described a series of wars waged throughout 
history over restrictions on the right to travel.  For example, Moses and the 
Israelites fought the Amorites for denial of “innocent passage through their 
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territory.”31  Agamemnon and the Greeks attacked the king of Mysia on the 
ground that "high roads were free by nature."32  Finally, the Germans were 
reported by Tacitus to have accused the Romans of barring all access to "the 
rivers and roads, and almost the very air of heaven."33  In addition to 
providing some historical context for his principle, Grotius also explained 
the rationale behind the principle. He pointed out that the necessities of life 
had been unevenly spread around the globe and that some nations had 
developed skills that other nations lacked.34  Grotius thus took the 
“interdependence” between the nations of the world as the main legal 
underpinning of free trade.  He also took the argument to its logical 
extension; mutual interdependence required free trade and free trade in turn 
required free access to the element over which connecting roads were 
running, in casu the High Seas.35  
B. Mare Liberum: The Genesis of Property 
¶9 Grotius distinguished three different terms used to signify the legal 
status of the sea. The sea was either “the property of no one (res nullius), or 
a common possession (res communis), or public property (res publicae).”36 
These classifications followed the classifications set forth in traditional 
Roman law.  Res nullius formed part of the larger class of res extra 
commercium, or properties that did not form part of the estate of a specific 
individual.37  However, these properties could be appropriated and become 
part of an individual estate.38  Res communes omnium were things 
belonging to everybody: the air, floating water, the sea and the shore.39  
“No one could own these things, but they could be used and enjoyed by 
everyone.”40  Res publicae were the rivers and the ports.41  
¶10 For a full comprehension of the legal implications of these terms, 
Grotius traced their origin and evolution.  Citing Cicero and Horace, he 
noted that in the beginning there was no particular right and nothing was 
private property.42  The fields were not separated by borders and “every 
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path was free, all things were used in common.”43   The rationale behind 
this original freedom, according to the early philosophers, was simply that 
nature or God had given all things to the human race and not to any 
individual in particular.44  This notion of original freedom, however, shifted 
over time as people started to use consumables.45  According to Grotius, the 
first category of consumables comprised food and drinks.46  Grotius 
claimed there could be no use of these things without a certain kind of 
ownership.47  They must belong exclusively to a given individual in a way 
that precludes their use by another person. Once moveable consumables 
became subject to possession, immovables such as fields and buildings 
could not “remain unapportioned.”48  While their use did not result in their 
consumption, they were necessary for the production and consumption of 
consumables.49  Ultimately, they too were in such scarce supply that they 
could not “satisfy the use of everybody indiscriminately.”50  Things that in 
former times had been held in common could now be deemed the property 
of individuals once they had occupied them.51  
¶11 Typically, it was sufficient if, after taking physical possession, the 
individual maintained the intention to possess. In the event, however, of 
things that resisted seizure, like wild animals, the occupation had to be 
uninterrupted.52  Consequently, “possession of movables implie[d] seizure,” 
whereas possession of immovables required the determination of 
boundaries.53  This transformation from common to private property was 
followed by the development of public property.  Public property exhibited 
characteristics of both common and private property.  While public property 
was technically owned by a particular state, it was usually free for all 
citizens of the state to use.  Interestingly, both private and public property 
arose in the same way and did not mutually exclude each other. Grotius 
observed, for example, that the land of Athens belonged to the Athenians 
but that the same land was split among individual owners.54 
¶12 Grotius reached two conclusions from these definitions of property. 
“[F]irst, that which cannot be occupied, or which never has been occupied, 
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cannot be the property of anyone, because all property has arisen from 
occupation.”55 Second, “all that which has been so constituted by nature 
that although serving some one person it still suffices for the common use 
of all other persons, is today and ought in perpetuity to remain in the same 
condition as when it was first created by nature.”56  Based on these 
conclusions, Grotius then listed many objects that by nature were open to 
the use of all; the water, the sun, the air and the waves.57  All of these were 
not susceptible to occupation, and their common use was destined for all.  
C. Mare Liberum and the Right to Fish 
¶13 As a res omnium communes the sea seems incapable of private 
exploitation.  This is not an absolute, however.  While some things created 
by nature for the use of mankind remain common to all, other things may, 
through the industry and labor of each man, become his own.58  Grotius 
argued that if any part of a common good is capable of occupation, it may 
become the occupant’s private property.59  He turned to various classical 
writers for support for this argument, of whom Plautus put it most 
eloquently: 
When the slave says: ‘The sea is certainly common to all persons’, the 
fisherman agrees, but when the slave adds: ‘Then what is found in the 
common sea is common property’, he rightly objects, saying: “But 
what my net and hooks have taken, is absolutely my own.”60
¶14 Fish become property of the first taker, for two reasons.  First, the 
uncertainty of ownership could not otherwise be avoided.61  Second, it was 
equitable that a premium be put on diligent labor and industry.62  However, 
the private property derived from the occupation of a suitable part of a 
common good is not absolute. Any occupation or private appropriation is 
conditional on the satisfaction of two fundamental imperatives. First, 
necessity, such as famine, may make common again things formerly owned 
privately.63 Necessity, according to Grotius, “reduces everything to the 
natural law, because the mother of positive law is utility and utility should 
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yield to necessity.”64  “By this law, if food becomes scarce on board a 
ship,” Grotius wrote, “what each man has, is gathered in a common 
store.”65  Second, a part of a common good will only become private 
property to the extent that such occupation does not impair its common 
use.66  For example, the Roman praetors were able to grant their subjects 
the right to occupy the shores within the limits of the Roman Empire.67  
However, these Romans did not have the right to prevent anyone else from 
accessing the shore and doing all things that were traditionally considered 
permissible.  Applying this standard to the case of the fisherman, the 
fisherman could claim private property on the fish his nets and hooks have 
taken, as long as he does not impair the common use of the fish in the sea.  
Put another way, he may not preclude anyone else from fishing.  In 
addition, he is subject to any public rule purporting to conserve fishing 
stocks because the rule is intended to protect the common good.  
¶15 In addition to the mutual interdependence, Grotius offered another 
rationale for the Mare Liberum.  Countering the oft-made argument that his 
work is an oratio pro domo for the Dutch,68 he points out that the case he is 
making “is the more reasonable, because their (the Dutch) advantage in this 
matter is bound up with the advantage of the whole human race, an 
advantage the Portuguese are trying to destroy.”69 He asserts that the 
competition he is advocating reduces the profits of monopolists, “to the 
corresponding advantage of all other men.”70 In other words, the Mare 
Liberum and the competition it allows serves mankind in the most 
beneficial manner.  
¶16 Applying Mare Liberum to the efforts to patent the human genome, 
the status of the Human Genome as a res omnium would not, per se, bar 
private appropriation of parts thereof, provided such appropriation does not 
impair its common use and provided that the privatized parts could become 
common again in the case of an emergency. These two conditions provide 
for a remarkable up-to-date, if inarticulate, framework to govern the 
exploitation of the human genome. First, under the “no impairment to 
common use” test, any claims to appropriate all or a part of raw genomic 
sequences making up the human genome would be invalid; as such claims 
would certainly impair common use of the human genome. Second, the 
“necessity” test provides ample justification to address any “necessities or 
emergencies that might arise as a result of abusive use of appropriated 
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sequences, as may the case with genetic test, by rendering common again 
things formerly owned.”71 A discussion of how “recommonization” takes 
place (e.g. research exemption, compulsory licensing) is beyond the scope 
of this iBrief. 
¶17 Not surprisingly, the Mare Liberum was met with criticism.72 
Specifically, Grotius’s contemporaries argued that the Mare Liberum was a 
cover, proclaiming in fact a liberty common to all nations to fish 
indifferently on all kinds of seas.73 One commentator, William Welwod, 
argued that community property bred disagreement and that whatever is 
owned communally is neglected due to natural viciousness.74 This argument 
was more fully articulated four centuries later when Garrett Hardin 
published The Tragedy of the Commons.75 Welwod also pointed out that 
community property carried with it the difficulty of administration,76 a point 
that will become more manifest in Part II.  
II. HOW TO EXPLOIT A COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND:  LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM PARDO 
A. Exploitation of the Common Heritage: the North vs. the South 
¶18 Having established that the Common Heritage principle does not 
bar appropriation per se, we will now apply the litmus test of the common 
heritage principle: How can it be reduced to practice? The Declaration 
stipulates that the benefits of genome research be made available to all and 
that nation states establish a framework of international co-operation with 
developing countries.77  While the Declaration itself fails to work out the 
details for such a framework, some commentators have proposed the 
establishment of a global genome trust.78  For example, the U.S. National 
Research Council has suggested that the interests of donors of human DNA 
samples, collected from populations across the globe, could be represented 
by an international organization that would serve as a trustee and fund-
holder for all the sampled populations. 79  Patents would be issued in the 
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name of this trustee organization, and the trustee would grant licenses to 
any party willing to share a portion of the net proceeds from products made 
from any patented gene, gene sequence or cell line with the trustee 
organization. The trustee organization, in turn, would be required to ensure 
that the licensing revenue benefited the participating populations, which 
would have representatives in the trustee organization.80  This section will 
examine the viability of the trustee by revisiting the foremost example of an 
application of the common heritage principle: Pardo’s solution to the 
appropriation of the deep-seabed resources. 
¶19 Under Pardo’s proposal, the bounties of the deep seabed would be 
declared “the common heritage of mankind.”81  In order to effectively 
manage the common heritage, Pardo required a properly established 
international regime to assure peaceful use, orderly exploitation in the 
interests of mankind, with particular regards to the needs of poor countries, 
and freedom of research, with the results available to all.82  The 
international regime would act as a trustee for all countries over the oceans 
and the ocean floor.83  The agency was to be endowed with wide powers to 
regulate, supervise and control all activities on or under the ocean and the 
ocean floor.84  It was to also have the power to regulate the commercial 
exploitation of the ocean floor by issuing exploration rights.85  Pardo’s 
proposal prompted the United Nations to start negotiations that would create 
such an international regime during the Convention on the Law of the 
Seas.86 
¶20 Throughout the proceedings of the Convention, a key controversial 
issue was how the resources of the deep seabed, having been declared the 
common heritage of mankind, were to be exploited.87  Did Pardo’s common 
heritage principle comport with collectivist or unilateral exploitation?  Or as 
Baslar put it: “The crux of the issue since the advent of the common 
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Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and the 
Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 
UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). 
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heritage of mankind has always been about what kind of model of 
management would best serve the common interest.”88  
¶21 The issue divided the North from the South.89  Most developed 
countries in the North held the view that, pending the negotiations that were 
to lead to the adoption of the Convention, unilateral mining of the mineral 
resources of any area of the sea beyond the limits of national jurisdiction 
could proceed as a permissible exercise of the freedom of the high seas.90  
Under the northern view and international law as it then stood, the main 
beneficiaries of mining would be a handful of developed States, regardless 
of whether the source of international law was the flexible “exploitability 
criterion” set forth in the 1958 Convention, the res communis doctrine or 
under the res nullius.91  
¶22 In contrast to the northern view, most developing countries from the 
South argued that the deep seabed resources were unique and belonged to 
the whole of mankind.92  They employed the common heritage of principle 
as a tool to implement the ideas underlying the establishment of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO)93 set forth in the 1974 Declaration by 
the United Nations General Assembly.94  The UN resolution provided that a 
new international economic order should be founded on several enumerated 
principles, particularly sovereignty over national resources in developing 
countries.95  The NIEO provided for a comprehensive alteration of the 
world economic system, claiming that the disparities in income between 
states are unjust and caused by unfair economic arrangements.96  The 
proposed wealth transfer from the North to the South was justified on the 
rationales of charity and/or guilt.97  The arguments of the South were 
supplemented by some observers from the North, appealing to self-interest; 
that relieving poverty in the South by transferring wealth would help build 
markets for Northern exports and avoid conflicts and mass immigration.98  
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As part of the implementation of the NIEO, the South then advanced a 
novel variant of the res communis doctrine.  The model would permit the 
South to control and appropriate the benefits of exploitation and give it 
access to the technology necessary to exploit the resources, despite its 
inability to contribute to seabed development.99  As Pardo had suggested, 
this required the establishment of an international seabed authority that was 
to have the power to engage in seabed mining and to control mining by 
licensees.100  
¶23 The resultant United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(Convention)101 predominantly supported the goals of the South and the 
NIEO.  The communist countries initially denounced the creation and 
administration of a “common ownership of all mankind” as one more 
international machinery serving the predatory aims of capitalists’ 
monopolies.102  Yet, the centralized production regime created under the 
Convention could hardly be called anything but communistic.  As one 
commentator has observed, the full complexity of the system proposed 
under the Convention can “only be fully appreciated by reading through the 
provisions of Part XI, Annexes III and IV, and the two Resolutions.”103  For 
purposes of our reality check of analogous proposals for the exploitation of 
the human genome however, a summary of the system is provided in the 
following section. 
B. The Convention: Governance and Research of the Common 
Heritage 
¶24 The Convention created a legal regime governing the prospecting, 
exploration and exploitation of deep seabed mining.104  The Convention 
declared the “Area” and its resources the common heritage of mankind and 
establishes a supranational Authority with taxing and licensing powers and 
the right to mandate technology transfer.105 The Area was defined as the 
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seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.106  Under the common heritage doctrine, Nation-States would 
become stakeholders in the Ocean commons and all rights in the resources 
of the Area were vested in mankind as a whole.107 No State could “claim or 
exercise sovereignty over any part of the Area or its resources” except in 
accordance with the Convention, the Charter of the United Nations and in 
the interests of maintaining peace and security and promoting international 
cooperation and mutual understanding.108  
¶25 The Convention granted plenary power to the International Seabed 
Authority (Authority), which was composed of all States Parties to the 
Convention.109  The Authority was divided into three principal organs: the 
Assembly, the Council, and Secretariat.110  The Assembly was the plenary 
body composed of all Authority members; it elected the Council and 
Secretary-General, assessed contributions, gave final approval to the rules 
and regulations of the Authority, approved the budget, and decided on the 
sharing of mining revenues received by the Authority.111  Each nation 
received one vote in the Authority.112  The Council was the executive body 
of the Authority and had primary responsibility for the administration of 
seabed mining regime.113  It approved work plans for mining and developed 
rules for the equitable sharing of the financial benefits to be derived from 
the seabed.114  The Council was assisted by an Economic Planning 
Commission and a Legal and Technical Commission.115 As the operating 
arm, carrying out mining, transport, processing and marketing activities in 
the seabed directly, the Convention introduced the mining entity: the 
Enterprise.116  The Enterprise, through mandatory transfer, was guaranteed 
access on request to seabed mining technology owned by private 
companies. The Authority was financed by contributions from members, 
funds received in connection with its activities and from the Enterprise.117  
The Enterprise was to be subsidized by the signing nations and compete 
against its licensees.118  The initial costs of setting up the institutional 
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infrastructure of the mining regime were estimated to range between $ 350 
and $700 million.119  
¶26 Under the Convention, states and international organizations have a 
general right to conduct marine scientific research, subject to its provisions, 
and a general obligation to promote scientific research and cooperate in the 
conduct of research.120  Groups wishing to prospect could do so only if they 
complied with the Convention and the rules of the Authority concerning 
certain training programs.121  These programs related to marine scientific 
research and programs for the transfer of technology to the Enterprise and to 
developing States with regard to activities in the Area.122 They further 
included facilitating the access of the Enterprise and developing States to 
the relevant technology under fair and reasonable terms and conditions.123 
The prospector was also required to notify the Authority of the proximate 
area of his prospecting activities.124  Prospecting could be conducted 
simultaneously by more than one prospector in the same area or areas.125  
While prospecting did not confer any rights on the prospector with respect 
to resources, a prospector could recover a reasonable quantity of minerals to 
be used for testing.126 
C. The Convention: Terms of Exploitation of the Common Heritage 
¶27 Only the Enterprise, States Parties, and their private enterprises 
could apply to the Authority for approval of plans to work in the Area.127  In 
order to be eligible for exclusive exploration and exploitation rights, an 
operator had to meet certain qualification standards.128  While the 
Enterprise could apply to prospect any part of the Area, other applicants 
were restricted to certain reserved portions of the Area and were subject to a 
host of additional requirements.129  Each application, other than those 
submitted by the Enterprise or by any other entities for reserved areas, had 
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to cover a total area “sufficiently large and of sufficient estimated 
commercial value to allow two mining operations.”130  The Authority could 
accord the operator the exclusive right to explore and exploit one of the two 
sites, with respect to a specified category of resources and enter into a 
contract with the applicant incorporating that plan (the “parallel system”). 
131  If the Authority granted exploitation rights to one site, it had to 
designate the other site as “reserved area.”132  The Enterprise would then be 
given the opportunity to decide whether it would carry out activities in a 
reserved area.133  Both exploration and exploitation could only be carried 
out in areas specified in the above plans and in accordance with the terms of 
a contract to be concluded between the Authority and the operator.134 
¶28 In addition to the previously mentioned provisions, the Convention 
included a number of other stipulations and requirements.  For instance, the 
Convention established a fifteen-year limit on the annual production of 
seabed nickel.135  The underlying motivation for the limit was to protect the 
prices and production levels produced by less-developed land-mining 
countries, heavily dependent on export-income.136  The Convention also 
required applicants to make technology available to the Enterprise and 
developing States which it used in seabed activities, on fair and reasonable 
commercial terms, if the Enterprise could not obtain such technology on the 
open market.137  As a general principle, the Annex prescribed that “title to 
minerals shall pass upon recovery in accordance with the Convention.”138  
Title to all minerals in the Area fundamentally belonged to mankind as a 
whole.139  Title to the minerals could then vest in the person that recovered 
them from the Area, provided that person complied with the provisions of 
the Convention.140  It would be up to the Authority to provide for the 
equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from 
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activities in the Area through any appropriate mechanism.141  In addition, 
the Convention provided for detailed regulation of data transfer142 and 
training programs and promoted the acquisition, dissemination and 
development of marine technological knowledge, including measures to 
help transfer this technology to developing countries.143  
D. The 1994 Amendment Agreement 
¶29 As observed by one commentator, no sketch could do justice to the 
baroque architecture of the Convention.144  Not surprisingly perhaps, 
several industrialized states refrained from signing the Convention, due to 
its exceptionally precise regulations and precedential impact.145  When the 
developing states started to realize that they would have to bear the costs 
associated with the institutional architecture, informal negotiations were 
launched in search of a compromise.146  In the Post Cold War neo-liberal 
climate of the early nineties, these negotiations resulted in the 1994 
Implementation Agreement.147  This Agreement simplified the structure of 
the Authority, provided for additional safeguards to protect the interests of 
the mining community and replaced the mandatory technology transfer 
provisions with a set of guidelines.148  These guidelines obliged contractors 
to cooperate with the Authority in obtaining technology for the Enterprise 
and developing States on fair and reasonable terms, consistent with the 
effective protection of intellectual property rights.149  The Agreement 
further eliminated production limits and provided that the Enterprise and 
commercial miners would stand on an equal footing, neither being 
subsidized.150 All other provisions of the Convention remained intact.  
Although a few prospecting agreements have been concluded with pioneer 
investors, to date, even under the terms as modified by the 1994 Agreement, 
the framework for the exploitation of the deep seabed resources has failed to 
attract any significant investment.151  This lack of investment is primarily 
due to market developments and the discovery of substantial new land-
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based reserves of nickel, copper and cobalt.152  Yet, it seems safe to assume 
that the baroque architecture of the framework and the associated 
uncertainty over return on investment contributed to the demise of the 
Convention.153  
¶30 The lessons learned from Pardo’s proposal are evident if the reader 
contemplates the enormities of the application of the system established by 
the Convention, mutatis mutandis, to the exploitation of the human genome. 
Apart from the sheer number of provisions and their level of detail, they 
took almost twenty-five years to negotiate.  This is certainly too long for 
those involved in the biomedical research enterprise, researchers, companies 
and patients alike, to wait before moving genome knowledge from the 
bench to the market-place. While the efforts of Celera, the company that 
improperly threatened to privatize the entire genome, should be deplored for 
attempting to remove raw genomic sequence date from the public domain, 
the company’s slogan that speed matters can hardly be denied. This, of 
course, is not to suggest that no international cooperation is possible. The 
successful completion of the HGP by the International Consortium bears 
testimony to the contrary. However, when establishing an international 
framework for the commercialization of the human genome and the sharing 
of any benefits, by way of a global fund or trust, the lesson to be learned 
from the Convention is that such a framework may be prone to 
overregulation due to the number of stakeholders involved and the 
divergence of their interests and views.  
¶31 Notably, one result of the Convention’s failure to reach a lasting 
solution has been the creation of a much simpler mechanism to achieve 
benefit-sharing. Various states have imposed a tax on the removal of deep 
seabed minerals. For example, the U.S. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral 
Resources Act of 1980 imposed a tax on any removal of a hard mineral 
resource from the deep seabed pursuant to a deep seabed permit.154  In a 
similar fashion, I have proposed a special tax on tissue and cell products 
that have been directly developed from human sources.155 Taxation is an 
effective, if indirect, mechanism for distributing the benefits of a particular 
activity throughout a community. The proceeds of such a tax could be 
earmarked to sustain, for example, government subsidies of affordable 
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healthcare insurance or orphan disease programs, to make the advances of 
genome research available to all.156 
CONCLUSION 
¶32 The current approach to dealing with the human genome is found in 
the UNESCO Declaration.  As has been demonstrated, the Declaration 
stipulates that the human genome, in its natural state, shall not give rise to 
financial gains, implying that the common heritage principle bars private 
appropriation.  The Declaration also calls for the establishment of a legal 
framework aimed at making the benefits of genome research available to 
all.  However, analysis of international precedents demonstrates, first, that 
the lesson learned from Grotius is that the status of a res omnium does not, 
per se, render a good incapable of private appropriation, provided such 
appropriation does not impair its common use and provided that the 
privatized parts could become common again in the case of an emergency.  
Second, when establishing an international framework for the exploitation 
of the human genome and the sharing of any benefits by way of a global 
fund or trust, the lesson learned from Pardo is that such a framework may 
be prone to excessive, unbalanced and counter-productive regulation.  This 
is not only due to the number of stakeholders involved and the divergence 
of their interests but also to the sheer number of provisions, the level of 
detail of such collectivist frameworks, and the time it takes to negotiate 
them.  The twenty-five years needed to negotiate a resolution for the 
distribution of sea bed resources is too long for a product like the human 
genome where speed matters for researchers, companies and patients. A 
more plausible way to ensure benefit-sharing could be the introduction of a 
tissue tax.  Such a system would distribute benefits of genome projects to 
the entire world community in an efficient and expeditious manner. 
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